What is Sport (Philosophically Speaking)?

Abstract

This paper proposes an analysis of sport from an analytic-philosophical point-of-view. The authors argue that although a definition in the traditional sense (per genus proximum and differentiam specificam) – conceived as analytic, synthetic, or regulative – is rather impossible, a conceptual description, using some key intuitions, can be achieved. These intuitions are suggested by taking into account phenomena such as physical culture and its properties, Olympic games and their regulations, or the popularity of sport as perceived by direct spectators and indirect observers, particularly on television. Various examples suggest that sport is a complex phenomenon, generally consisting of the actions of people, subordinated to rules that govern how sport actors behave. Hence, a normative aspect of sport must be taken into account in any conceptual analysis of sport. If the traditional manner for defining a concept is considered unavailable, then Wittgenstein’s strategy of analysis, via the notion of family resemblance, is recommended. The authors show that this can also be applied to the concept of sport. After mentioning Renford Bambrough’s interpretation of Wittgenstein, the authors propose to treat the name sport as referring to a mereological collection of parts, unified by several factors and forming a family resemblance.