

Development of Jaina Pramāṇasāstra in the Commentaries of *Tattvārthasūtra*

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Abstract:

In Jaina philosophy, *pramāṇa* is accepted as a definitive knowledge of an object and knowledge itself. There are many treatises on Jaina *pramāṇa-śāstra* which include epistemology and logic according to Jainism. Since Siddhasena's *Nyāyāvātra* more than forty texts and commentaries are available on this subject. Five types of knowledge i.e. *matijñāna* (knowledge through sense organs and mind), *śrutajñāna* (scriptural or verbal knowledge), *avadhijñāna* (clairvoyance), *manahpariyayajñāna* (knowing the modes of others' minds) and *kevaljñāna* (knowledge of all substances and modes) as mentioned in the canonical literature are the basis of the development of Jaina *pramāṇa-śāstra*. Contributions of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (720–780), Vidyānanda (775–840), Anantavirya (950–990), Vādiraj (1025), Abhayadevasuri (10th century), Prabhācandra (980–1065), Vādi devassūri (1086–1169, Hemacandra (1088–1173), Dharmabushaṇa (15th century), Yaśovijaya (18th century) are very important in the development of Jaina *pramāṇa-śāstra*, the *Tattvārthasūtra* and its commentarial literature has also a significant role in developing the Jaina *pramāṇa-śāstra*. This development has three aspects—conceptual, analytical and logical. The *Tattvārthasūtra* is the first text which established the classification of knowledge as two types of *pramāṇa* – *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *parokṣa* (indirect *pramāṇa*). An intensive discussion on Jaina epistemology or *pramāṇa-śāstra* is seen in the commentarial literature of the *Tattvārthasūtra*.

Keywords: knowledge, *pramāṇa*, perception, inference, probans, probandum, determinate, indeterminate.

1. Introduction

The *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti or Umāsvāmi is the first Sanskrit text of Jaina philosophy. It contains ten chapters in the style of aphorisms and was coined in the second century. It bears the essence of Jaina canonical literature in respect of the branches of philosophy i.e. epistemology, metaphysics and ethics.

Commentary writing is an old tradition in Jainism. There is a vast variety of commentaries on canonical literature. Mainly five types of commentaries are available: 1. *niryukti* 2. *bhāṣya* 3. *cūrṇi* 4. *tīkā* or *vṛtti* 5. *tippaṇa*. *Niryuktis* and *bhāṣyas* have been written in Prakrit verses. *cūrṇis*

were written in mixed Prakrit and Sanskrit languages. *Tīkā* or *vṛtti* were constructed in Sanskrit. *tippaṇa* were written in Gujarati and Rajasthani and marugurjar. *Vivṛtti*, *avacūri*, *dīpikā* were also the types of commentaries in Sanskrit with minor differences from *tīkā*.¹

Not only on *Āgamas*, on Jaina philosophical texts also a huge commentarial literature is available. The *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti, the *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra, the *Nyāyāvātāra* of Siddhasena are some instances on which a long tradition of commentaries is found. In the latter literature also commentaries like the *tattvabodhavidhāyinī* of Abhayadevasūri (11th century) the *prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* and the *nyāyakumudacandra* of Prabhācandra (980-1065) are eminent [5, pp. 56-59].

2. Commentaries on the *Tattvārtha Sutra*

The main commentaries on the *Tattvārthasūtra* are as follows: 1. The *Tattvarthabhāṣya* by Umāsvāti himself. 2. The *Sarvārthasiddhi* by Pūjyapāda Devanandin (5th century). 3. The *Tattvārthabhāṣya vṛtti* by Haribhadra Suri (700-770) which was completed by Yaśobhadra. 4. The *Tattvārtha-Vārttika* by Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (720-780). 5. *vṛtti* by Siddhasenagaṇin (9th century). 6. The *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika* by Vidyānanda. 7. The *Tattvārthavṛtti* by Śrutasāgarasūri (14th century). Here for discussion on development of *pramāṇa-śāstra* five commentaries (as shown above orderly 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6) are being used.

Although on *pramāṇa-śāstra* in Jaina philosophy several texts like the *Nyāyāvātāra* of Siddhasena, the *pramāṇasaṅgraha*, the *Laghīyastraya*, the *Nyāyaviniścaya*, the *Siddhiviniścaya* of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka, the *pramāṇa-parīkṣā* of Vidyānanda, the *Parīkṣāmukha* of Māṇikyanandin, the *pramāṇanayatattvāloka* of Vāḍidevasūri, the *pramāṇamīmāṃsā* of Hemacandrasuri, the *Jainatarkabhāṣā* of Yaśovijaya, the *pramāṇa-prameyakalikā* of Narendrasena are separately available, but the *Tattvārthasūtra* and its commentaries also contributed a lot.

3. Establishment of *Pramāṇa* in the *Tattvārthasūtra*

The *Tattvārthasūtra* is the first text which established knowledge as *pramāṇa* in Jaina philosophy. In canonical literature five types of knowledge are mentioned. The *Tattvārthasūtra* categorised them into *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *parokṣa* (indirect) division of *pramāṇa*. Thus Umāsvāti gave a shape to Jaina *pramāṇa-śāstra*. Five aphorisms are most significant for establishing *pramāṇa śāstra*:

1. *Pramāṇa-nayairadhigamaḥ*.1.6
2. *Matīśrutāvadhimanḥparyāyakevalāni jñānam*. 1.9
3. *Tatpramāṇe*. 1.10
4. *Ādye parokṣam*. 1.11
5. *pratyakṣamanyat*.1.12.

In the subsequent aphorisms of the first chapter description of five knowledges is very interesting. Description of *naya* is older in Jaina tradition. That is also a means of knowing. Umāsvāti clubbed the both *naya* and *pramāṇa* as the means of knowledge or cognition. *Naya* is a viewpoint for knowing and *pramāṇa* is a valid means of knowledge which is greater than *naya* and also a kind of knowledge. Difference between these two is that *naya* is a part of *pramāṇa* and it is limited mainly to scriptural or verbal knowledge only, whereas *pramāṇa* is a determinate cognition and it is related to all five kinds of knowledge. In this way Jains are different from other Indian branches of philosophy. The concept of *naya* is a specialty of Jaina philosophy which is not found in other philosophies.

Fivefold knowledge is mentioned as follows: 1. *matijñāna* or *ābhiniḥbodhika jñāna* – this knowledge occurs through sense organs and mind. 2. *śrutajñāna* – scriptural or verbal knowledge 3. *Avadhijñāna* – clairvoyance or visual intuition by a soul 4. *manḥ-paryāyajñāna* – modes of other's mind are known lucidly 5. *kevalajñāna* – substances and their modes of present, past and future are

known directly and lucidly by a perfect soul. Among these the first two knowledges are considered as *parokṣa* (indirect) *pramāṇa* and the last three are accepted as *pratyakṣa* (direct) *pramāṇa* because these are manifested directly through a soul. In this way the concept of two *pramāṇas* was established by Umāsvāti.

4. Concept of Four *Pramāṇas* Prior to the *Tattvārthasūtra*

Prior to the *Tattvārtha sūtra*, in Jaina canonical literature mention of four *pramāṇas* of Nyāya philosophy is found. In the *Sthānāṅgasūtra* (sthāna 4), the *Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra* (5.3), the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* [(*bhāvaguṇavarṇa*)] four *pramāṇas* are mentioned as- 1. *pratyakṣa* (perception) 2. *anumāna* (inference) 3. *aupamya* (comparison) and 4. *āgama* (testimony). These four *pramāṇas* were well known at that time, hence *Caraka-samhitā* of Caraka and Buddhist text *Upāyahṛdaya* (p. 13) also describe these four *pramāṇas* [5, pp. 5, 9].

Anuyogadvāra sūtra of Āryaraksita gives a detailed account of these four *pramāṇas* [1]. It propounds two types of *pratyakṣa*: 1. Sensuous (*indriya pratyakṣa*) 2. Non-sensuous (*no-indriya pratyakṣa*). In sensuous *pratyakṣa*, Āryaraksita puts knowledge manifested through five sense organs and in non-sensuous *pratyakṣa* he keeps three types of direct knowledge as *avadhijñāna*, *manahparyāyajñāna* and *kevalajñāna*. Inference is of three types: 1. *pūrvavat* 2. *śeṣavat* 3. *dr̥ṣṭasādharmyavat*. This division is similar to the division mentioned in the *Nyāyasūtra* and Sāṃkhya philosophy but the description and examples shown in the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* are different and related to our life of behaviour. Here a few examples of various kinds of inference are described which show the speciality of this canon.

1. *Pūrvavat* – to know a prior acquainted person or thing knowing its old mark, scar, signal, etc., for example a mother recognises his son after a few years seeing his scar on head. In the latter development of Jaina logic such example is included in *pratyabhijñāna* (recognition) *pramāṇa*. In Nyāya philosophy inference of effect from a cause is considered as *pūrvavat*.

2. *Śeṣavat* – it has been introduced of five types: 1. inference of cause from an effect e.g. from a sound inference of conch, from *kekā* voice inference of peacock, from raining inference of clouds, hearing neigh-sound inference of a horse, from whipping inference of kettledrum. These are the practical examples in life. 2. Inference of effect from a cause – seeing threads inference of making clothes, from the lump of clay inference of making an earthen pot. 3. Inference of substance from quality or attribute e.g. inference of flower from its perfume, inference of salt from its taste, inference of cloth from its touch. 4. Inference of an aggregate from a part, e.g. inference of buffalo from horns, inference of cock from a crest, inference of an elephant from a tusk, inference of monkey from its tail, inference of a bull from its hump etc. All these examples are based on our practical life. 5. Inference of asylum from a dependent e.g. inference of fire from smoke (generally this example is given for inference of cause from effect in Indian tradition), inference of water seeing multitude of ducks, inference of a noble son by his etiquettes etc.

3. *Dr̥ṣṭasādharmyavat* – In Nyāya and Sāṃkhya philosophies word *sāmānyatodr̥ṣṭa* is used for it. *dr̥ṣṭasādharmyavat* is of two types – *sāmānyadr̥ṣṭa* and *viśeṣadr̥ṣṭa*. knowing one thing to know other similar things or knowing many things to know other similar thing is *sāmānyadr̥ṣṭa* inference e.g. as one human is, other humans are also alike him, as other humans are, a human is also like them. In *viśeṣadr̥ṣṭa* one thing is known differently from many.

The *Anuyogadvārasūtra* enumerates *aupamya pramāṇa* twofold as: 1. *sādharmyopanīta* (showing similarity) 2. *vaidharmyopanīta* (showing dissimilarity). Testimony is of two kinds: 1. *laukika* (worldly) – the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata* etc. 2. *lokottara* (statement of *tīrthaṅkara*) [1]. Description of *aupamyapramāṇa* and *āgama pramāṇa* is also intelligible for practical life, but here we have to discuss mainly this subject according to the *Tattvārthasūtra* and its commentaries.

5. Contribution of the *Tattvārthasūtra* and its Commentaries

What has been discussed about *pramāṇa* and its various aspects in the *Tattvārthasūtra* and its commentaries which shows the development of Jaina logic and epistemology is now to be focused. Jaina philosophical commentarial literature contributed in three aspects of development: 1. Conceptual development 2. Analytical development and 3. Logical development. We find all these three aspects of development in the commentaries on the *Tattvārthasūtra*. There are more than 15 commentaries on the *Tattvārthasūtra*, but here only five commentaries as mentioned before are taken into consideration.

As we know that the *Tattvārthasūtra* is the first text which developed the concept of *pramāṇa* in the Jaina framework. It established knowledge as *pramāṇa* first time in Jaina philosophy which opened the doors for the philosophers to construct the independent texts on *pramāṇa*. Siddhasena was the first to write a text named the *Nyāyāvātāra* and then Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka wrote many texts on Jaina epistemology and logic. This tendency was continued for centuries. Commentaries are also written enriching the analytical and logical aspects. Commentators on the *Tattvārthasūtra* also contributed a lot.

6. *Pramāṇa*: A Discussion

Umāsvāti defines *pramāṇa* in his *svopajñā bhāṣya* as the organ of cognition of an object-*pramīyante arthāstairiti pramāṇani* [16, 1.12]. Through which objects are cognized are *pramāṇas*. Pūjyapāda Devanandin in the commentary *Sarvārthasiddhi* defines *pramāṇa* etymologically in three ways – *pramīṇoti*, *pramīyate anena*, *pramītimātram vā pramāṇam* [9, 1.10, p. 72]. Grammatically *pramāṇa* word has ‘pra’ prefix, ‘ma’ root and ‘lyut’ suffix. Suffix ‘lyut’ is used in three meanings: doerness, an instrument and abstract state. Devanandin applied all these three meanings in the above definition. According to him that which knows rightly (*pramīṇoti*) that by which anything is known rightly (*pramīyate anena*) or right knowledge is itself (*pramītimātram vā*) is *pramāṇa*. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka justified all these three aspects giving example of a lamp which illuminates, illuminated by which and illumination itself – all these three aspects are right [2, 1.10, p. 72]. Haribhadrasūri accepts only its instrumental meaning in his commentary: *pramīyate anena tattvamiti pramāṇam karanarthābhīdhānaḥ pramāṇasabda iti* [13, 1.6, p. 69]. Instrumental meaning of *pramāṇa* is vastly acceptable in Indian philosophies. Jaina philosophers also accepted its instrumental nature only in the latter period. Siddharsigaṇin in the *Nyāyāvātāravivṛti* gives etymological explanation of *pramāṇa* in six cases and as abstract (*bhāva*), but he advocates only instrumental case and denies all other meanings [12].

Pramāṇa illuminates the objects as well as itself. Hence Pūjyapāda Devanandin mentions two types of *pramāṇa* – *tatra pramāṇam dvividham svārtham parārtham ca* [9, 1.6, p. 14]. For the self and for others. In Buddhist logic inference is divided into two types – for the self (*svārthānumāna*) and for the other (*parārthānumāna*) [3, 2.1-2]. Devanandin propounds that except *śrutajñāna* every *pramāṇa* is for the self, but *śrutajñāna* is of two types - for the self and for the others. He also explained that for the self it’s in the form of knowledge and for the others it is in the form of statement [9, 1.6, p. 14]. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka also propounds in the *Tattvārthavārttika* that purpose of knowledge is of twofold- knowledge for the self knower and for the others. In the form of knowledge it’s for the self and for the others it’s in the form of statement (*adhigamaheturdvividhaḥ svādhigamaheturjñānātmakah pramāṇanayavikalpakaḥ parādhigamaheturvacanātmakah*) [2, 1.6, p. 33].

7. Definition of *Pramāṇa*

Commentator Vidyānanda gives complete definition of *pramāṇa* in the *Tattvārthasloka-vārttika* – *Tatsvārthavyavasāyātmaññānam mānamitīyatā. lakṣaṇena gatārthatvād vyarthamanyad viśeṣaṇam* [14, 1.10.77].

The determinate (*vyavasāyātmaka*) cognition of the self and the object is *pramāṇa*. This definition is quite sufficient any other adjective to it is futile. This definition of *pramāṇa* shows conceptual development in the commentarial literature and is a resultant of the definitions given by Siddhasena (*pramāṇam svaparābhāsi jñānam bādhavivarjitam*) [11, p. 1]. Samantabhadra (*svaparāvabhāsakam yathāpramāṇam bhūvi buddhilakṣaṇam*) [10, p. 63] and Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka in *Laghīyastraya*, 60 (*vyavasāyātmakamjñānamātmārthagrahakam matam. grahaṇam nirṇayastena mukhyam prāmāṇyamaśnute*) in their independent texts on Jaina logic. Determinate word is very important in this reference, it excludes doubt (*saṁśaya*), illusion (*viparyaya*) and indetermination (*anadhyavasāya*) in the nature of *pramāṇa*. Vidyānanda in another treatise the *Pramāṇa-parīkṣā* defines *pramāṇa* as *samyajjñāna*. This *samyajjñāna* is also a determinate knowledge devoid of doubt, illusion and indeterminateness. Here one development is seen. In the *Tattvārthasūtra*, *samyajjñāna* (right knowledge) is a part of means of liberation from bondage which requires right view (*samyagdarśana*) prior to it, but in the *Pramāṇa-parīkṣā* it is useful for right behaviour. This *samyajjñāna* doesn't necessarily require *samyagdarśana* prior to its occurrence in the case of *pramāṇa*, but for liberation *samyagdarśana* is necessary prior to *samyajjñāna*.

8. Cognition of Cognized Object is also *Pramāṇa*

Mīmāṃsā philosophy propounds *pramāṇa* as cognition of unknown objects only. Its renowned definition is: *tatrāpūrvārthavijñānam niścitam bādhavarjitam. aduṣṭakāraṇārabdham pramāṇam lokasammatam*.

The knowledge which cognizes hither to uncognized object, which is determinate, unobstructed, produced through non defective cause and which is acceptable in the public is *pramāṇa*. Vidyānanda negates all these inessential adjectives except the adjective determinate.

In Buddhist philosophy also *pramāṇa* is accepted as knowledge which cognizes uncognized object: *ajñātārthajñāpakamiti pramāṇa- sāmānyalakṣaṇam* [7]. Vidyānanda refutes this definition presenting the following argument:

*ajñātārthaprakāśaścellakṣaṇamparmārthataḥ.
gṛhītagrahaṇānna syādanumānasyānumānatā.
gṛhītamagrhitam vā svārtham yadi vyavasyati.
tanna loke na śāstreṣu vijahāti pramāṇatām* [14, 1.10.68 & 79].

If the original *lakṣaṇa* of *pramāṇa* is cognition of unknown objects, then validity of inference will not occur due to its characteristic of knowing the previously known object through recollection of invariable concomitance. Recollection of invariable concomitance is a cognition of previously cognized objects, which helps in inference of unknown objects. A *pramāṇa* doesn't leave its validity in the public and in the *śāstras* if it cognizes the object already cognized. It should definitely cognize the self and the object, no other adjective is needed. By this statement, he also negates Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka [17, p. 175] and Māṅikyanandin [6, 1.1] who incorporated respectively adjectives as *anadhigata* (*pramāṇam avisamvādirjñānama- nadhigatārthādhigamalakṣaṇatvāt*) and *apūrva* (*svāpūrvārthavyavasāyātmakam jñānam pramāṇam*) denoting previously unknown objects. Actually this was an impact of Mīmāṃsā and Bauddha philosophies on some Jaina philosophers. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka was not of a strong view to put this adjective (*anadhigata-grāhaka*) in the definition of *pramāṇa*, this is why in the *Tattvārtha-vārttika* he says – *yathā andhakāre avasthitānām ghatādīnāmutpattyanantaram prakāśakam pradīpa uttarakālamapi na tam vyapadeśam jahāti evam jñānamapi* [2, 1.12, p. 56]. For instance a lamp illuminating objects like pots kept in the darkness, illuminates them in the subsequent time also. It does not leave its name as an illuminating lamp, so is the cognition. It means *pramāṇa* does not leave its validity even after knowing the object previously known. Hence Vidyānanda takes a clear cut stand and refutes his predecessor Digambara *ācāryas*. In Shvetambara tradition all philosophers accept that determinate cognition of previously cognized object is also *pramāṇa*. Hemacandrasūri presents a cogent

argument that cognition of an object to be cognized is valid at present, likewise this cognition of an object previously cognised is also valid [4, 1.1.4].

9. Sense Organs and Sense-Object Contact is not *Pramāṇa*

Naiyāyikas accept sense organs and sense-object contact as *pramāṇa*, because these are used as instrumental means in perception. Jaina philosophers don't accept sense organs and sense-object contact as *pramāṇa*. Devanandin in the *Sarvārthasiddhi* gives argument – if for differentiating *pramāṇa* from its resultant, sense-object contact is considered as *pramāṇa*, and the cognition of an object is as resultant, then a problem arises. Sense-object contact remains in both a sense organ and an object, hence its cognition should remain in both a sense organ and an object, but it is not found in the object [9, 1.10, p. 69]. In this way Devanandin presents a puzzle for Naiyāyikas and then provides a solution from Jaina point of view. He says that considering cognition as *pramāṇa*, there is an interest or negligence towards the object known and that is a resultant of *pramāṇa*. Another effect or resultant is destruction of respective ignorance [9, 1.10, p. 70]. All these are the consequences of cognitive *pramāṇa*.

Vidyānanda says in the *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika* – sense organs are basically inanimate, hence they are not *pramāṇa*. Knowledge is animate, it illuminates the self and the object, whereas the above two are not self illuminating. Vidyānanda argues – if eyes are known as *pramāṇa*, then pots etc are also to be treated as *pramāṇa*, but in Jaina philosophy sense organs are considered as made of *pudgala* (matter) and knowledge is considered as conscious [14, 1.6, pp. 40-41]. Vidyānanda gives a new dimension to this subject. In the Jainism sense organs are meant of two types – physical (*dravyendriya*) and conscious (*bhāvendriya*). Vidyānanda considers physical sense organs as *apramāṇa* (invalid *pramāṇa*) and the conscious senses as *pramāṇa*, because these are having knowledge in some respect [14, 1.10.10].

One another argument is given by Pūjyapāda Devanandin – if sense-object contact is a *pramāṇa* (especially perception), then how will be the cognition of micro objects, obstructed objects and distant objects? These objects don't come in the contact of sense organs. Also their omniscience will not be possible. This objection will also arise in accepting the sense organs as *pramāṇa*. One more argument is this – the sense organs like eyes can know the limited objects whereas the knowables are unlimited [9, 1.10, p. 69]. Devanandin also presents the viewpoint of Jainism according to which object-contact is not found with all sense organs, because eyes and mind are not nearly contactable [9, 1.10, p. 69]. Through them the objects are known at some distance. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka also supported Devanandin in the *Tattvārtha vārttika*. He says – if sense-object contact is *pramāṇa* then there will be absence of omniscience, because for an omniscient, sensuous contact is not possible [2, 1.10, p. 51]. This type of argument indicates that the concept of *yogi* perception through transcendental contact is a later development in Nyāya – Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

10. Illuminating the Self and an Object

Knowledge in Jaina philosophy is accepted as illuminating the self and an object, hence *pramāṇa* is also having the same characteristic. Other philosophers may ask a question – if through *pramāṇa* animate and inanimate objects are known, then how the *pramāṇa* will be known? If it's known through another *pramāṇa*, then infinite regress will come. Devanandin replies – a lamp illuminates the objects and itself, like that a *pramāṇa* illuminates the objects and itself. If *pramāṇa* is not self illuminating then its recollection can't take place and in the absence of memory and recollection valid behaviour will not be possible [9, 1.10, p. 70]. Akalaṅka in the *Tattvārtha-vārttika* also propounded that knowable is cognised through *pramāṇa*, but for knowledge of *pramāṇa* no other means is needed because *pramāṇa* illuminates itself also. If it's not self illuminating then it will not be a *pramāṇa*, because of two reasons. The first is – it will be known by another *pramāṇa*, and that by another one and that by another one. In this way it will lead an infinite regress. The second

argument is – in the absence of the self illumination, recollection of it will not be possible and the knower will not be able to say that he knows that object [2, 1.10, p. 49].

11. Inclusion of *Avisaṃvādakatā*

Dharmakīrti, a Buddhist philosopher propounded an empirical definition of *pramāṇa* – *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam* [8, 1.3]. The cognition of an object without any discrepancy in its resultant is *pramāṇa*. Jaina philosophers also used the word *avisaṃvādakam*, but they accepted it in the meaning of determinate knowledge which is devoid of doubt, illusion and indeterminateness. Vidyānanda also mentions – *yathā yatrāvisaṃvādastathā tatra pramāṇata* [14, 1.10.38]. The cognition with its determinant characteristic is proved as *pramāṇa*. He also mentioned that *kevalajñāna* is more lucid and *avisaṃvādaka* than *avadhijñāna* and *manahparyāyajñāna* and these two are more lucid and determinant than *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna*, hence their validity depends on the lucidity and determinateness [14, 1.10.39].

The knowledge is obscured by knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇa*) *karma* and it is manifested after destruction (*kṣaya*) or subsidence-cum-destruction (*Kṣayopaśama*) of that *karma*. In absence of this ability no cognition or knowledge occurs. This is the specific notion of Jaina philosophy. Due to the difference in this ability knowledge of every living being varies. The knowledge *Kevalajñāna* manifests after the complete destruction of *jñānāvaraṇa* *karma*, hence it bears completeness of knowledge of every substance and its mode. *avadhijñāna* and *manahparyāyajñāna* also manifest after subsidence-cum-destruction of their obscuring *karmas*. Above these three types of knowledge arise without the use of sense organs. *matijñāna* is a sensuous knowledge and ability for its manifestation is found different due to different state of subsidence-cum-destruction of its obscuring *karma* and defective sense organs. *śrutajñāna* also arises after subsidence-cum-destruction of its obscuring *karma*, but it requires precedence of *matijñāna*. Generally it's called scriptural or verbal knowledge. It arises after listening to a sentence or word. Hence it's considered under the category of testimony or *āgama pramāṇa*. Although every *pramāṇa* is valid for behaviour and no one is greater or inferior, variation in their purity and lucidity can't be denied.

12. Refutation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

Akalaṅka in the *Tattvārthavārttika* refutes the concept of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in which they accepted knower and *pramāṇa* different. He says – Knower and knowledge are not absolutely different, because then in the absence of knowledge the state of knower becomes as non-knowing. If he is believed as knower after the contact of knowledge, then without the nature of knowing he can't be called as knower. For example a blind man cannot see even after the contact of a lamp with him [2, 1.10, p. 50].

Pramāṇa is not absolutely different from its resultant and also it is not absolutely identical with that. This non-absolutist view point of Jainism is presented in the commentaries on the *Tattvārthasūtra*. If they are absolutely different then there will be no connection between them as *pramāṇa* and its resultant and if they are identical then there will be no difference between them. Accepting any thing, denying any thing or to become neutral to that are the resultant cognition which are different from *pramāṇa* whereas destruction of related ignorance is an identical resultant of *pramāṇa* [14, 1.6.42].

13. Perception (*Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa*)

Defining *pratyakṣa* (perception) Devanandin gives etymological explanation – *akṣṇotivyāpnoti jñānātītyakṣa ātmā tameva prāpta- kṣayopaśamaṃ prakṣṇāvaranaṃ vā pratiniyataṃ pratyakṣam* [9, 1.12] – *pratyakṣa* word is derived from *prati* prefix and *akṣa* word. The etymological meaning of *akṣa* is a knower and that is a soul. Direct knowledge of that soul without any help of sense organs

and mind is perception. This is the original view of the *Tattvārthasūtra* and its tradition. He also says that if only sensuous knowledge is considered as perception then the knowledge of trustworthy seers will not come in the category of perception [9, 1.12]. Haribhadrasūri also advocates this notion that direct knowledge of a soul without the help of sense organs and mind is perception. He ignores the statement of *Nandisūtra* in which *indiyapaccakkham no-indiyapaccakkham* words were used. Accepting them as secondary another sentence of *Nandisūtra* mentions *matināṇaparokkham ca suyanāṇaparokkham ca. Matijñāna* is manifested through sense organs and mind, hence it is indirect (*parokṣa*) [13, 1.11]. In the *Tattvārthavārttika* definition of perception is clear-*indriyānīndriyānapekṣamatītav-yabhicāraṃ sākāragrahaṇaṃ pratyakṣam* [2, 1.12]. Perception is a definitive cognition devoid of fallacies and without the help of sense organs and mind. Here *sākāra* word excludes *avadhidarśana* (a conscious experience before clairvoyance) and *kevaladarśana* (conscious experience before *kevaljñāna*) from the category of perception, because they are non-definitive in nature.

In the latter period Jaina logicians accepted the sensuous knowledge as empirical perception. Its impact is seen in the *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika* where Vidyānanda quotes definition of perception from his predecessor Akalaṅka:

*pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇaṃ prāhuḥ spaṣṭaṃ sākāramañjasā.
dravyaparyāyasāmānyaviśeṣārthātmanivedanam* [14, 1.12.4].

According to this *lakṣaṇa* (defining characteristics) lucidity is the main characteristic of perception. This lucidity includes the sensuous knowledge also in the category of perception. In this way two types of perception emerged as (i) empirical in the form of definitive sensuous knowledge and as (ii) transcendental in the form of definitive knowledge manifested directly in a soul viz. *avadhijñāna*, *manahparyāyajñāna* and *kevalajñāna*. In Jaina philosophy *darśana* is a technical term which is also a characteristic of a conscious soul and occurs before knowledge of any object, but it doesn't bear a characteristic of definitive knowledge, hence it is not meant as *pramāṇa*. This is why *nirvikalpa* or *anākāra darśana* is not understood as *pramāṇa*.

Due to the essential characteristic of definitive cognition of *pramāṇa* Jaina philosophers refute the Buddhist notion of *nirvikalpaka* perception. Vidyānanda refutes the definition of perception propounded by Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti says that perception is devoid of verbal construction (*kalpanā*) and also it is non-illusionary. Vidyānanda proposes four meanings of *kalpanā*: 1. Inexplicit cognition is *kalpanā*. 2. Determinate knowledge of the self and the object is *kalpanā*. 3. The verbal designation is *kalpanā*. 4. Verbal designability is *kalpanā*. Out of these four he negates the first meaning and accepts second meaning as determinate cognition of the self and the object as a necessary adjective of perception [14, 1.12.8-9]. A new development is also seen in the *Tattvārtha śloka-vārttika* due to the non-absolutist view of Jainism, Vidyānanda accepts perception as *nirvikalpaka* in the sense of devoidness from verbal structure. He accepts its *savikalpakatā* in the sense of determinate cognition and *nirvikalpakatā* in the sense of devoidness from verbal designation. In his view a definitive knowledge without verbal designation may be considered as perception. Vidyānanda says in brief:

*sarvathā nirvikalpakatve svārthavyavasitiḥ Kutah.
sarvathā savikalpakatve tasya syācchabdakalpanā* [14, 1.12.27].

Determinate knowledge is not possible in absolutely *nirvikalpakatā* and in absolutely *savikalpakatā* where a verbal construction is essential. He tried to establish *savikalpakatā* in some respect in the Buddhist perception also [14, 1.12.28-32].

14. *Parokṣa* (Indirect) *Pramāṇa*

It is notable that Devanandin, Haribhadra and Akalaṅka do not discuss five types of indirect (*parokṣa*) *pramāṇa* in their commentaries on the *Tattvārthasūtra*. Absence of this discussion in the *Tattvārthavārttika* of Akalaṅka is astonishing, because Akalaṅka is the logician who established the five types of indirect *pramāṇa* in his other treatises. It gives an indication to think whether the writer of *Tattvārthavārttika* is a different person? It is a big question which requires a separate paper.

Vidyānanda has discussed all the five types of indirect (*parokṣa*) *pramāṇa* i.e. *smṛti* (recollection), *pratyabhijñāna* (recognition), *tarka* (inductive reasoning), *anumāna* (inference) and *āgama* (testimony). He cogently establishes the validity of all these five *pramāṇas*. In his view without accepting validity of recollection, validity of recognition doesn't exist and without accepting the validity of recognition, validity of inference can't exist and without accepting the validity of inference perception can't be established. Then in the absence of *pramāṇa* no object will be proven. Thus all systems of *pramāṇa* and objects will be abolished [14, 1.13.9-11]. Vidyānanda presented separate arguments to establish these five indirect *pramāṇas* in the *Tattvārthaslokavārttika* efficiently which are to be consulted there. He also described inference in detail with the description of probans, probandum, invariable concomitance etc. He gives a detailed account of the kinds of probans [14, 1.13.14].

15. Conclusion

Thus, the description of *pramāṇa-śāstra* available in the commentaries on the *Tattvārthasūtra* depicts a continuation of the developing thoughts of the commentators. This is understood that the subject of the *Tattvārthasūtra* and commentaries has a vast field of Jaina philosophy, even then the wide discussion on *pramāṇa-śāstra* is found here. It gives light on the notions of other philosophies and shows arguments for their refutation also.

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Notes

1. *Niryukti* explains the selective content of *āgama* and propounds the right meaning in the context of a word. Examples and stories are also added for explanation. *bhāṣya* is greater in size and some independent content to explain. Some verses of *niryukti* are incorporated in *bhāṣya*. This is different from the Sanskrit *bhāṣyas* of Indian tradition in style and content. Sanskrit *bhāṣya* is found in prose, whereas *bhāṣyas* on *āgama* are in Prakrit. *cūrṇi* is shorter than *bhāṣya* and very brief. Commentaries as *tīka*, *vṛtti*, *vivṛtti*, *avacuri*, *dīpikā* have minor differences among them.
2. It looks like a definition of Buddhist view.