

## The Nature of the Anti-Psychologistic Turn in Kazimierz Twardowski's Philosophy

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### *Abstract:*

In this paper, I analyze the shift in Twardowski's views between his early psychologistic theory of logic and his later anti-psychologistic theory. In particular, I point out that the interpretation suggesting that this change merely involves Twardowski enriching his ontology with products encounters a certain problem in light of his earlier views. To present this problem more precisely, I discuss the foundations of Twardowski's theory of products, focusing on aspects relevant to the issue of psychologism. Based on this, I reconstruct Twardowski's theory of logic and highlight where he identified the fallacy of psychologism. I contrast this reconstructed theory with Twardowski's earlier views at key points and demonstrate that the difference between his early psychologistic theory and his later anti-psychologistic theory is a matter of a shift in emphasis rather than a significant change in the theoretical system itself, and that Twardowski himself understood it as such.

*Keywords:* Twardowski Kazimierz, anti-psychologism, product, internal complement, abstraction, philosophy of logic.

### 1. Introduction

One of the most lively debated problems in European philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century was the relationship between logic and psychology. Many authors of this period, in one way or another, reduced logic to psychology, holding the position commonly referred to as psychologism (in logic). However, at some point, this trend began to reverse. The impulse for the widespread departure from views that reduced logic to psychology came among others from Husserl, who presented arguments against such an approach in the first volume of the *Logical Investigations* (1901/2001). One of the philosophers who joined this anti-psychologistic turn was Kazimierz Twardowski. As he attests in his autobiography,

But Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, which appeared some years later (1900/1), convinced me that it is impossible to treat psychological, that is, empirically acquired, knowledge as the basis of logical, thus a priori, propositions. My book on the basic con-

cepts of didactics and logic [(Twardowski, 1901)] was written prior to my study of Husserl's work, so that in it I still came forth as an "exponent of psychologism" [Psychologist]. But my psychologism of that period manifests itself more in the demarcation of the material to be dealt with than in the manner of its treatment. For I maintain in general that the opposition between psychologism and anti-psychologism in logic is ultimately an issue that pertains to the scope of its domain rather than to the theoretical grounding of its propositions. (Twardowski, 1926/1999, p. 31)

In light of the above quotation, it seems quite reasonable to divide Twardowski's work into two stages: psychologistic and anti-psychologistic. Such a division is suggested, for example, by Jan Woleński's remarks in the book *Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School* (1989). To specify more precisely the nature of the change in Twardowski's views, Woleński proposes distinguishing between ontological psychologism and methodological psychologism. Methodological psychologism can be defined as a position according to which in a given scientific field (e.g., logic), methods specific<sup>1</sup> to psychology should be applied. In the case of Twardowski, these would be methods specific to a certain variant of Brentanian descriptive psychology. On the other hand, ontological psychologism would be a position according to which the subject of study of a given science (e.g., logic) consists of certain mental objects. Based on these distinctions, Woleński describes the change in Twardowski's thinking as follows: "Twardowski was at first a methodological and ontological psychologist, but later (from 1902 on) he abandoned ontological psychologism. Husserl's influence was not without importance in that respect (Woleński, 1989, p. 41)."

This opinion is also echoed by Kleszcz (2020, pp. 79-93), who, while describing Twardowski's philosophical development in this regard, expands upon the interpretation put forth by Woleński.

However, the mentioned anti-psychologistic turn is associated with a certain puzzle. As evident from the above quotation, Twardowski claims to have moved away from psychologism after 1901, yet in his book *Zasadnicze pojęcia logiki i dydaktyki...* [Basic Concepts of Didactics and Logic...] (1901), he still is a psychologist. However, before transitioning to anti-psychologistic positions, he published the essay "On So-called Relative Truths" (Twardowski, 1900/1999; Twardowski, 1900/1965), in which he criticized theories that recognize the existence of relative truths. The problem, however, is that certain formulations in this essay suggest that at this stage, he already has a theory that deals with psychologism no worse than the theory presented later in his essay "Actions and Products" (Twardowski, 1911/1999; Twardowski 1911/1965), which is considered a mature expression of his anti-psychologism. If this is indeed the case, then the above fragment, in which Twardowski acknowledges that it was Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1901/2001) that convinced him of anti-psychologism, becomes entirely perplexing.

In this text, I aim to delve deeper into the presented problem and propose a preliminary hypothesis to resolve it. To accomplish this, in Section 2, I enumerate the types of sources essential for reconstructing Twardowski's thoughts regarding psychologism and briefly discuss various issues associated with utilizing these sources to interpret his views. Then, in Section 3, I present selected fragments of the theory of products that Twardowski thoroughly developed in his work "Actions and Products" (1911/1999; 1911/1965). The discussion is confined to matters directly related to his anti-psychologist theory of logic, specifically focusing on characterizing products, their classification, the status of non-enduring products, and a theory of meaning based on this framework. Building on this foundation, in Section 4, I explore Twardowski's views on the subject of logic and the specific methods of logical research, contrasting them with his understanding of psychologism and its perceived fallacies. Finally, in Section 5, I contrast the reconstructed theory of logic with Twardowski's earlier views and propose a solution to the presented problem.

## 2. The Sources for Reconstruction of Twardowski's Anti-Psychologic Turn

To understand the nature of Twardowski's anti-psychologic turn, we must first delve into how Twardowski understood the fundamental issues concerning the problem of psychologism, including the subject of psychological research, the subject of logical research, and the very essence of the psychologic theory of meaning.

To fully reconstruct Twardowski's views on these issues, at least four types of sources are important. The foremost and most significant source is his published works. Following this are his unpublished notes, the majority of which are currently being made available, encompassing his notes for presentations or lectures. The third source is Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1901/2001), which, according to the passage cited above from Twardowski's autobiography, contributed to his change of views. The fourth source is the texts of Jan Łukasiewicz, a student of Twardowski, who was a staunch opponent of psychologism.<sup>2</sup> Although the first of these sources is uncontroversial, the remaining ones are associated with certain problems.

The problem with unpublished writings is that in the case of some of them, we don't know to what extent they reflect Twardowski's thoughts, because some are unfinished, and some consist of lecture notes during which he presented not only his point of view. Therefore, in some cases, it is uncertain whether these are views reconstructed by him or views he holds. As an illustration of this problem, we can cite, for example, the texts of programs of logic for gymnasia included in the first volume of Twardowski's "Inedita" (1922/2023, pp. 35-47) to which a series of notes was appended, one of which reads: "My theoretical convictions conflict with pedagogical considerations." (1922/2023, p. 47). In my opinion, this observation suggests that when reconstructing Twardowski's theoretical thought, we should not treat the content of these programs on par with the content of lectures. However, they can be a valuable indication of his approach to good pedagogical practice. These circumstances highlight the need for caution among researchers of Twardowski's views who utilize unpublished writings. Context becomes paramount in interpreting particular statements. However, it is essential to note that in reconstructing Twardowski's theoretical thought, the content of his lectures should not be deemed less significant than that of texts prepared for publication. Twardowski himself admitted in his "Philosophical Autobiography" (1926/1999, p. 30; 1926/1992, p. 31-32) that many of his theoretical findings were solely presented during lectures, without further intention for publication.

The problem with using Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1901/2001) in the reconstruction of Twardowski's anti-psychologic turn lies in the fact that even if we introduce the idealizing assumption that Twardowski fully understood Husserl's work<sup>3</sup>, his specific agreements with Husserl's approach remain unclear beyond the comments found in his own writings and these comments are confined to passages where he discusses the issue of psychologism. Consequently, any attempt to interpret Twardowski's thoughts through the lens of Husserl's work inevitably involves a degree of speculation. Likewise, assessing Łukasiewicz's influence on Twardowski regarding this matter presents difficulties. While it is evident that Twardowski was familiar with Łukasiewicz's stance, as evidenced by their correspondence (Łukasiewicz, 1905/1998, pp. 468-471), it remains uncertain whether all of Łukasiewicz's arguments resonated equally with Twardowski.

Since comparing Twardowski's theory with Husserl's on one hand and with Łukasiewicz's on the other would require more extensive research, in this article, I will primarily focus on Twardowski's published writings and certain excerpts from unpublished writings.

## 3. Outline of Theory of Products

The natural starting point for considerations regarding Twardowski's approach to psychologism seems to be his work "Actions and Products" (1911/1999; 1911/1965), as many analyses of Twardowski's thought treat this work as directed specifically against psychologism in logic.<sup>4</sup> Although this view may seem exaggerated considering how little space is devoted to logic in this work, it is undeniable that the distinction between actions and products played a fundamental role for

Twardowski in delineating the subject matter of logic and psychology. In this work, Twardowski observes that “a rigorous demarcation of products from actions has already contributed enormously to liberating logic from psychological accretions.” (1911/1999, p. 132; 1911/1965, p. 240). Therefore, to understand the nature of this change in Twardowski’s thinking, one must understand the theory itself.

The starting point for Twardowski’s theory of products is rooted in certain linguistic facts. In his work, he mentions a series of word pairs such as “to run – a run,” “to think – a thought,” “to speak – a speech,” “to draw – a drawing,” and shows that there are significant semantic differences between the words in these pairs. According to him, the first words in the discussed pairs denote actions, while the second words denote products. Twardowski also points out that when we want to use a noun to denote an action, we usually use verbal nouns (*substantiva verbalia*, *gerunds*) such as “running,” “thinking,” “speaking,” or “drawing.” Furthermore, the semantic differences between the words in the aforementioned pairs are significant enough that something can be asserted about the product that is not asserted about the corresponding action, indicating that products and actions differ from each other. For example, if we say that a decision has not been put into action, we do not mean to say that the act of deciding has not been put into action (Twardowski, 1911/1999, p. 115; Twardowski 1911/1965, p. 226).

In elucidating the concept of products, Twardowski (1911/1999, p. 108; 1911/1965, p. 220) characterizes them as something that arises as a result of the respective actions. According to Twardowski, a drawing arises from the act of drawing, a run arises from the act of running, and a thought arises from the act of thinking. In connection with this definition, Izydora Dąmbska (1975, p. 255) rightfully pointed out that such a characterization is insufficient because it would lead us to conclude that all effects are products of certain actions. For example, the product of singing would not only be the song but also the fact that the singer has somewhat worn vocal cords. However, such a situation would render Twardowski’s entire concept meaningless in theoretical terms because firstly, it is universally agreed that actions have effects, and secondly, it is entirely unclear how the existence of consequences would free us from the problems of psychologism.

However, Dąmbska’s reconstruction is not entirely correct because Twardowski provides another condition which, although difficult to consider as an objective characteristic of products, allows us to identify them and distinguish them from other effects. Apart from detailed linguistic analyses by Twardowski, we can say that if there is a noun that can serve as the internal complement of a certain verb, then the denotation of this noun is a product of the action denoted by that verb (Twardowski, 1911/1999, p. 107; Twardowski, 1911/1965, p. 219). The given noun is an internal complement<sup>5</sup> in two cases: (1) when it appears alongside the verb within an etymological figure (for example, the noun “dance” in the expression “to dance a dance” is an internal complement); (2) when for the entire phrase consisting of the verb and the noun functioning as its complement, there exists a synonymous verb without a complement (for example, the noun “jump” in the phrase “to execute a jump” is an internal complement because there is a verb “to jump” which means the same as this phrase) (Twardowski, 1911/1999, p. 107; Twardowski, 1911/1965, p. 219).

Dąmbska, of course, is aware that Twardowski extensively discusses verbs with internal complements, but she denies that Twardowski limits himself to them in his work. However, upon closer analysis of this work, it turns out that all nouns designated by Twardowski as products meet the criteria for internal complements, and in cases where we may have reasonable doubts about whether a given noun meets this criterion, Twardowski indeed asserts that it does.<sup>6</sup>

Another important element for the discussed problem in the work “Actions and Products” (1911/1999; 1911/1965) is the divisions of products. Firstly, Twardowski categorizes products, much like associated actions, into physical and mental (*psychical*),<sup>7</sup> and among physical products, he distinguishes a special subclass, namely *psycho-physical* products. A product of this kind arises from a *psycho-physical* action, which is a physical action influenced by a mental action.<sup>8</sup> Particularly important examples of *psycho-physical* products are words. Secondly, Twardowski divides products into enduring and non-enduring ones. Enduring products are those that exist longer than the action that produces them, while non-enduring products are products that exist only as long as the

action that produces them lasts. Non-enduring products include, among others, all products of mental actions.

Based on such a characterization and Twardowski's use of terms like "product" or "arising as a result of a certain action," one could rightly assume that, like enduring products, non-enduring products exist as something dependent yet simultaneously distinct from the actions that produce them. In this view, the act of thinking would relate to thoughts as playing an instrument does to the sounds produced. The sounds are entirely dependent on the actions of the player but are nonetheless separate from them. Although this interpretation may seem plausible at first glance, it is not in line with Twardowski's intention, as he adds the following remark in a footnote: "Non-enduring products do not exist in actuality separately from the corresponding actions, but only in conjunction with them; we can only analyze them abstractly apart from these actions (Twardowski, 1911/1999, p. 119)."

A similar remark can also be found in the text "O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju" [On psychology, its Subject, Tasks, Method, Relationship to Other Sciences, and Its Development] (Twardowski, 1913/1965, p. 268), where it is stated that mental products form a specific whole with the corresponding actions, and only through abstraction and analysis can actions and products be distinguished.<sup>9</sup> These passages suggest that the relationship between actions and products is much closer than it might initially seem. In other words, to use another Twardowski's term, it can be said that non-enduring products are metaphysical parts<sup>10</sup> of the respective actions, while representations of these products are what he calls "analytical concepts."<sup>11</sup>

In light of such a characterization, it seems that the difference between actions and products is merely conceptual, meaning that the distinction between actions and products exists only at the level of objects of given analytical concepts, while in the object itself to which these concepts refer, there is no difference between actions and products, meaning that the products Twardowski speaks of are merely mentally conceived objects.<sup>12</sup> However, such an interpretation would be inconsistent with how Twardowski describes the process of abstraction. He clearly distinguishes between the attributes that an object possesses and the attributes of a given object that we mentally represent in a concept (Twardowski, 1910-1914/2023, p. 266).<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, by specifying the attributes extracted in abstraction, he states the following: "Sometimes we call those extracted attributes 'detached attributes,' because by extracting attributes, we detach them, so to speak, in thought from the concrete object in which they reside." (Twardowski, 1910-1914/2023, p. 263). The word "reside"<sup>14</sup> used here clearly indicates that the attributes themselves, which are extracted from the subject of abstraction by Twardowski, are conceived realistically, rather than, as the considered interpretation suggests, anti-realistically.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, I believe that such an interpretation should be rejected, and we should understand products as metaphysical parts of actions, which are simultaneously really distinct from those actions.<sup>16</sup>

Based on this theory of products, Twardowski also outlines a broad theory of meaning. In the context of our discussion, the most important aspect is its fragment concerning the meaning of words. The meaning of a given linguistic expression, which is a particular psycho-physical product, consists of all the products of such mental actions that influence the psycho-physical action, of which the expression is a product, provided that this psycho-physical product can become a partial cause of the emergence of a similar mental product, or mental product which is the same as the original one, in someone. To put it more concretely, if I utter a certain sentence, under normal circumstances, the cause of uttering that sentence is the judgment I have made. If this sentence can cause the emergence of the similar judgment, or judgment which is the same as the one I have originally made, in myself or another person, then that judgment is the meaning of that sentence. Such sentences that arise as a result of certain acts of judgment Twardowski one can call "statements."<sup>17</sup>

At this point, however, one could have several legitimate doubts. Firstly, can it be claimed within this conception that language users in a given community employ the same meanings of words since a given psycho-physical product can evoke more or less different mental states in different individuals? Secondly, what about sentences we are merely considering the truth of?

To the first of these problems, Twardowski responds as follows:

However, insofar as we regard that psychophysical product as a product that signifies some sort of mental product, the disparity among the mental products elicited by it does not go too far – there must be a group of common attributes in these individual mental products. And it is precisely these common attributes (in which these individual products accord) that we ordinarily regard as the meaning of the psychophysical product, as the content inherent in it, provided of course that these common attributes correspond to the intent with which that psychophysical product was utilized as a sign. (Twardowski, 1911/1999, p. 127)

Thus, if, for example, a sentence was uttered to inform someone truthfully about something, the content of that sentence will consist of those components of the judgment that are common to all other users of that language who use that sentence. According to Twardowski, individual users arrive at this meaning through abstraction from the specific characteristics of concrete products, and it is precisely the ability to abstract that enables people to use similar signs that signify the same thing. The fact that Twardowski speaks in this context of the components agreeing rather than being the same suggests, I believe, that these components are not a certain universal that exists in all the thoughts of individuals who use this meaning, but numerically different attributes.<sup>18</sup> Such an abstracted judgment can be termed an “abstract judgment.”

The second of the aforementioned problems Twardowski solves through the concept of surrogate products. Surrogate products (also: artificial products) are, in his view, those products that imitate the products of another kind. Thus, although both of these products arise from different actions, one of these actions proceeds in such a way that its product imitates the product of the other. In the case of sentences we are merely considering, we do not deal with judgments that, under normal circumstances, constitute the meanings of sentences, but only with represented judgments. Represented judgments differ significantly from ordinary judgments because the latter assert the existence of their object, whereas represented judgments do not. Represented judgments can be reconstructed using the phrase “I think of x as something that is P,”<sup>19</sup> where P is a shorthand term for the conjunction of all the attributes I associate with the object I am thinking about. Thus, according to Twardowski, under normal circumstances, when we utter the sentence “Lviv is a beautiful city,” we have a judgment composed of the subject of that judgment, Lviv, the foundation [osnowa] of the judgment, which is the existence related to that subject, and the quality, which is a statement or denial of that existence about that subject (Twardowski, 1910-1914/2023, p. 273). In this case, it would be appropriate to say that the judgment, which is the meaning of this sentence, is “There exists a Lviv that is a beautiful city.” However, if I am merely considering the sentence “Lviv is a beautiful city,” I am only thinking of Lviv as something that is a beautiful city,<sup>20</sup> although in this case, I do not necessarily want to acknowledge that there exists a Lviv that is a beautiful city. In this way, Twardowski dismisses the second of the objections raised.

According to Twardowski, linguistic expressions are also something that preserves the associated mental products because even though a given mental product ceased to exist long ago, there still exists a psycho-physical product that, as mentioned, can evoke in someone a mental product similar in significant respects. However, this preservation can lead us to mistakenly conceive these expressions as something permanent and independent of the mental actions that led to their creation (Twardowski, 1911/1999, p. 127; Twardowski, 1911/1965, p. 235).

#### **4. The Approach to the Issue of Psychologism by Twardowski**

Against the backdrop of the presented theory of products, we can move on to establish the basic issues related to the problem of psychologism, namely the following questions:

1. What is the subject of logic?
2. What methods are appropriate for studying the subject of logic?

3. What is the subject of psychology?
4. What methods are appropriate for studying the subject of psychology?
5. What is psychologism?

Throughout the reconstruction, I will pay the least attention to issues (3) and (4), which I will address only to the extent that they allow us to better understand the contrast between logic and psychology in Twardowski's approach.

In his work "Actions and Products" (1911/1999; 1911/1965) Twardowski dedicates relatively little space to the subject of logic. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, we learn from this work that according to Twardowski, the concept of product plays a significant role in delineating the subject of logic from the subject of psychology. Furthermore, as one of the examples of the use of the word "judgment," he mentions that it is said that certain judgments result from logical inferences, but because this is only an example, it cannot be taken as an affirmation of such a belief.

A far more significant line of inquiry seems to be Twardowski's remarks regarding the role of artificial statements in logic. According to what has been mentioned above, an artificial statement is a sentence (a psycho-physical product) that imitates a statement but did not arise as a result of an act of judging, but merely as a result of representing judgment (which product is represented judgment). As examples of such artificial judgments, Twardowski cites symbolic notations like "*SaP*" as well as false premises used to illustrate valid reasoning. In the footnote following this passage, we can read the following:

Bernard Bolzano was the first to consolidate in detail this perspective on the subject matter of logic. Judgments that have been rendered independent from the actions of judging, in the manner discussed above, he termed *Satze an sich*. Along with *Satze an sich*, Bolzano also spoke of *Vorstellungen an sich*, that is, representations that in a similar manner have been rendered independent from the actions of representing (see his *Wissenschaftslehre*, op. cit., v. I, §§19-23 and 48-53, where numerous quotes are also cited from the works of earlier authors who already came more or less close to grasping these concepts). (Twardowski, 1911/1999, p. 131)

At first glance, it appears that this excerpt contains a view on the subject of logic. This, I believe, has led some researchers to conclude that artificial judgments play a fundamental role in Twardowski's system when it comes to defining the subject of logic and safeguarding it against psychologism. Suggestions supporting such an interpretation can be found in the works of Izydora Dąmbska (1975, p. 256) and Jan Woleński (2022, p. 64-65). Furthermore, these authors suggest that this conception of artefacts is complemented by the concept of the preservation of products.

In such an approach, the subject of logical inquiry would either be (1) artificial judgments as something in which representations of judgments are expressed, replacing the judgments themselves, or (2) representations of judgments that imitate the judgments themselves. The first of the proposed options cannot be correct, and this can be observed based on the following excerpt in which Twardowski characterizes the object of interest for art historians:

The humanities, on the other hand, abstract from the actual connection between mental products and the mental actions that produce them, treating them as if mental products existed independently of the mental life in which they can truly exist. Therefore, an art historian considers and examines various artistic concepts, and aesthetic tendencies, as if they were something beyond the minds of people living in a given era. (Twardowski, 1913/1965, p. 268)

If the first proposed interpretation of the subject of logic were correct, then, by analogy, Twardowski should believe that an art historian does not study various artistic concepts, but rather certain works of art and books as products in which certain artistic concepts are expressed. However, he clearly states that an art historian studies the artistic concepts themselves. Similarly, if we

were to consider what a historian of philosophy studies when examining the correspondence of author A, in which he discusses the thoughts of author B, according to what Twardowski claims in this passage, we would have to say that he studies what author A thought about what author B thought. However, according to the above interpretation, we would have to say that he studies this correspondence as something in which representations of the judgments of author A are expressed, which replace the judgments of author B.

Does this mean, then, that logic studies representations of judgments that imitate judgments themselves? This also cannot be right, as indicated by the fact that in his lectures on syllogistic, he constantly talks about the relations between judgments, as can be confirmed by the following passage:

The relation of contradiction between two judgments is expressed in the law of contradiction [and] the law of excluded middle. Together, they state: contradictory judgments cannot both be true at the same time, nor can they both be false at the same time. (Twardowski, 1925-1926/2023, p. 182)

Therefore, it seems that logic, according to Twardowski, investigates certain relations between judgments based on their relation to truth or falsity. This conception is also indicated by the quoted reference to Bolzano. Twardowski suggests that his conception is akin to the logic of the latter, and the concept of a judgment is somehow connected with what Bolzano himself stated. However, it cannot be said that the concept of a proposition (sentence-in-itself, *Satze an sich*) corresponds to the concept of a presented judgment, as Bolzano also has an equivalent of the presented judgment mentioned by Twardowski, which he calls the idea of a proposition (sentence-in-itself) (Bolzano, 1837/2014, p. 60). Against the thesis that logic investigates presented judgments, one can also raise a doubt of a systematic nature - since presented judgments are not judgments themselves but only their representations, why should they exhibit the same logical relationships as judgments themselves?

At this point, it is reasonable to question what specific role artefacts would play in logic if they are not the subject of logic. To answer this question, it is worth recalling the following excerpt from the lectures on syllogistics:

And now [we will proceed] to the relations between statements (judgments). The matter now takes a fundamental turn because it concerns the truth and falsity of the 'judgments' *a, e, i, o*. [...] *SaP*, etc. – these are forms of statements. When I say "The judgment *SaP*," it is a shortened expression for: "Every judgment that can be expressed in a statement of the form *SaP*." Now, between the 'judgments' *a, e, i, o* – certain logical relations occur, i.e. concerning their truth and falsity. (Twardowski, 1925-1926/2023, p. 182)

Based on this excerpt, we can learn that in the research process, logicians consider a series of judgments that can be expressed in statements of the mentioned forms and attempt to determine whether there are appropriate logical relations between them, namely relations concerning their truth or falsity. The key point in this context is that the logician only considers these judgments, which is equivalent to simply representing them (they are represented judgments). Similarly, when recording the results of their research, their notes are not just statements but rather artificial (surrogate) statements. Thus, it can be suggested that in Twardowski's view, when a logician in their research expresses a logical formula, for example, *MaP*, they non-intuitively<sup>21</sup> represent a judgment that can be expressed in such a form, thus having certain general concepts of such judgments. Furthermore, when considering a syllogism in the form of "*MaP, SaM, therefore SaP*," similarly, they have a set of general concepts of such judgments and try to establish whether the logical relations they are interested in hold between these represented judgments. However, they do not research the concepts by which these judgments are given to them but rather focus on the judgments themselves. There-

fore, their subject matter is entirely universal because they are not discussing judgments issued by someone but all judgments that can be expressed in a given form. If artefacts did not exist, the logician would have to establish relationships between only those judgments that someone somewhere has issued. It appears that although artefacts are not the subject matter of logic, they still play an extremely significant role in the work of logicians. However, do artefacts and the preservation of products, in Twardowski's view, serve to protect us from psychologism?

Before I attempt to answer this question, I would first like to address how Twardowski understands psychologism itself. In this matter, the work "O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i o jej rozwoju" [On psychology, its Subject, Tasks, Method, Relationship to Other Sciences, and Its Development] (1913) proves to be very important, where Twardowski devotes a short paragraph to discuss this issue (p. 270-271). He characterizes there essentially two views, which he collectively refers to as psychologism. According to the first of these views, philosophical disciplines (i.e., logic, ethics, aesthetics, and theory of knowledge) are direct branches of psychology. According to the second view, philosophical disciplines should be based on psychology, which is the fundamental philosophical science. He then adds:

The examination of whether psychologism is justified would require a thorough analysis of the subject and methods of the mentioned sciences; however, it can be noted here that the source of psychologism seems to be the confusion between mental actions and mental products, as well as the oversight of the fact that mental products may possess properties whose relations (e.g., relations between judgments regarding their truth and falsity) can be determined a priori, therefore independently of the empirical results of psychology. Criticism of psychologism should not, however, blind us to the fact that our knowledge of even such properties of mental products, as well as the existence of mental products in general, is obtained solely through internal experience and the inferences drawn from it. (Twardowski, 1913/1965, p. 271)

Based on this passage, we know that Twardowski believed that:

1. we can determine a priori the relations between properties (e.g., truth) among mental products (e.g., judgments), and therefore independently of empirical investigations in psychology;
2. our knowledge of the properties of mental products, as well as the existence of mental products, is obtained through internal experience.

What did Twardowski mean by stating that these relations are determined a priori? To establish this, we can refer to (at least) two sources. Firstly, his lecture titled "Psychology of Thinking" (Twardowski, 1908-1909/2014; Twardowski, 1908-1909/2012), and secondly, the later text "A Priori, or Rational (Deductive) Sciences and a posteriori, or Empirical (Inductive) Sciences" (Twardowski, 1923/1999; Twardowski, 1923/1965).

In his lectures on the psychology of thinking in 1907, Twardowski explicitly opposed the treatment of logic as a psychology of thinking or its application. He presents the following argument against psychologism, which we can find in a very similar form in both Husserl (1901/2001, p. 46) and Łukasiewicz (1907, pp. 489-491): the results of psychology are merely probable, whereas the results of logic are certain, hence logic cannot be part of psychology or its application. In the course of discussing this argument, he presents a contrast between empirical and a priori sciences:

This very nature of being only probable is manifested in the fact that the results in empirical sciences can reasonably be subject to doubt; yet, it is impossible for the results in mathematics, which is a non-empirical or a priori, science which leads to certain results in the strict sense of the word. This is because mathematics does not deal with facts, but rather matters of detached or abstract concepts (called "abstractions" in short) as well as the relationships between these matters. Those arguments are not based on the observa-

tion of facts but on the analysis of concepts and on deduction. Logic reveals the same nature as mathematics. (Twardowski, 1908-1909/2014, p. 135)

Based on this, we can list several characteristics that a priori sciences such as logic and mathematics would have according to Twardowski:

1. The results of a priori sciences are (rationally) unquestionable/certain.
2. Denying the results of these sciences is absurd.
3. These sciences investigate objects of detached concepts and the relations between these objects.
4. These sciences rely on the analysis of concepts and deduction.

An additional point to the above point 4 may be Twardowski's remarks in the text "A Priori, or Rational (Deductive) Sciences and a posteriori, or Empirical (Inductive) Sciences" (1923), in which he distinguishes a priori sciences from a posteriori ones by referring to the method of justifying their theses. The former appeals to a justification based on a complex of definitions, axioms, and postulates, which serve as the starting point for reasoning (Twardowski, 1923/1999, p. 173; Twardowski, 1923/1965, p. 366).

Based on the above remarks, we can attempt to reconstruct Twardowski's understanding of logic as a science — its subject and method. The subject of logic are abstract judgments, which are given to the logician by appropriate concepts (represented judgments) that enable the examination of various kinds of judgments fulfilling a set of properties (e.g., they can be expressed in statements of a certain form). These must be abstract judgments, and not merely concrete, because reasoning is invariant concerning the specific properties of these products, for example, specific substrate representations that we have in the case of the subjects of judgments, which are objects of detached concepts. Both these judgments and presented judgments are products of corresponding actions. Since both judgments and representations are mental products, they are non-enduring products, that is, certain metaphysical parts of actions that do not exist separately from them. In this approach, logic examines objects on which several acts of abstraction have been performed. First, through abstraction, we distinguish the act of judging from the product of this act, i.e., the judgment.<sup>22</sup> At this stage, several properties characterizing the action as a whole are omitted, such as place or time.<sup>23</sup> Secondly, we abstract from specific features of given products, such as substrate representations that a given person associates with the subject of this judgment. Then, a transition is made from a given abstract judgment to all kinds of judgments that can be expressed in certain statements, which we can simply call general forms of judgments. In the case of these general forms of judgments, the course of abstraction depends on the type of judgment involved. In each judgment, Twardowski distinguishes (1) quality (affirmative or negative); (2) the foundation of the judgment (existence); and (3) the subject (Twardowski, 1910-1914/2023, p. 274), so each form of judgment should ultimately boil down to these elements. In the case of existential judgments, abstraction probably proceeds in such a way that in a given abstract judgment, the subject of that judgment given in the presentation is abstracted, thus obtaining two forms: "There exists P" and "There does not exist P." In the case of categorical judgments, the matter is more complicated, as Twardowski advocated Franz Brentano's idiogenic theory of judgments, so he acknowledged that each categorical judgment can be reduced to an existential judgment (Twardowski, 1910-1914/2023, p. 276). At the same time, considering that the form of categorical statements requires two subjects, it would probably be said that in such judgments we have a certain subject and a distinguished aspect of it. Therefore, when transitioning from an abstract judgment to its form, we omit the given subject and this distinguished aspect, thereby obtaining four forms: "There does not exist S that is not P" (corresponding to "All S are P"), "There does not exist S that is P" (corresponding to "No S is P"), "There exists S that is P" (corresponding to "Some S are P"), "There exists S that is not P" (corresponding to "Some S are not P") (Twardowski, 1899-1927/2023, p. 413). Presumably, in the case of other forms of judgments, Twardowski believed that such a form of abstraction was possible that would allow a given judgment to be reduced to these three components.

In light of such a reconstruction, it becomes clear why Twardowski claimed that logic deals with objects of detached concepts and its method is the analysis of concepts. These objects are the general forms of judgments that are given to us in detached concepts. It is also easy to understand what it would mean for logic to investigate certain relationships – these are certain relationships that can be distinguished among these abstract objects based on whether they collectively maintain truth, for example, whether they are not contradictory.

As for the method, we know that Twardowski believed that by having those objects of detached concepts, we can establish relationships between them, and he regarded denying the results of these considerations as absurd. Why? In the work “A Priori, or Rational (Deductive) Sciences...,” (Twardowski, 1923/1999; Twardowski, 1923/1965) he argued that the essence of aprioristic sciences is that they ultimately justify their claims based on axioms, definitions, and appropriate rules of inference. However, this cannot be the final answer because it is relatively easy to deny the conclusions drawn using a series of axioms - it is enough to negate one of the axioms. It seems that Twardowski’s ultimate answer is simply that these are self-evident judgments that do not require explanation and are acquired along with the acquisition of the aforementioned detached concepts. This is evidenced, for example, by a passage from the University Logic Course text from 1902/1903, where Twardowski states:

There are judgments whose truthfulness is beyond doubt: issuing such a judgment entails the incidental conviction that belief in it cannot be shaken. [Two examples:] the law of contradiction [and the law stating that] the part [is] smaller than the whole. [...] But it only takes this one thing, namely, for a person to have certain concepts in mind, for example, the concept of part and whole, for the truthfulness of [the second] judgment to be evident. For such judgments, we use the term “self-evident judgments.” (Twardowski, 1902-1903/2023, p. 133)

If the above interpretative hypotheses are correct, it also becomes clear why Twardowski regarded psychologism as false and how he opposed it. Psychologism wrongly assumes that logical relations are studied by examining entire cognitive actions, such as act of reasoning. Meanwhile, logic investigates relations of truth and falsity between general forms of judgments that various judgments may possess. However, these general forms of judgments exist only as a certain component of cognitive actions, and this component can be isolated only through the described multi-level abstraction. However, since the action of abstraction is necessarily connected with the possession of represented judgments, one can concede the correctness of the interpretation according to which artefacts are an essential part of Twardowski’s anti-psychologistic solution. However, their role is not to be the subject of logic but rather something through which we recognize the subjects of logic. In a sense, one could say that these represented judgments are to the logician what a microscope is to a bacteriologist – without them, his science is impossible, but they are not the subject of his interest. This characteristic is not limited only to logic but to all sciences that study objects of detached concepts.

At the same time, we must reject the interpretation according to which the concept of preservation of artefacts played any role in the discussed anti-psychologistic turn because firstly, Twardowski defines the independence of such preserved artefacts from the corresponding actions only as apparent, and secondly, because preservation plays no specific role in logic – it is neither a subject nor a cognitive mean to know this subject. Of course, this does not mean that the concept of the preservation of artefacts is irrelevant to the issue at all. However, it is important not because of logic itself, but because of the possibility of science in general. If artefacts could not be preserved, then language would be impossible, and consequently, science in general, including logic, would not exist. Therefore, the concept of preservation cannot be a solution to the problem because both psychologists and anti-psychologists assume some form of such preservation.

## 5. What Distinguishes the Anti-Psychologistic Stage From the Psychologistic One?

If the above interpretation is correct, we can contrast it with Twardowski's views expressed before 1902, which he considers to be the moment of departure from psychologistic views. It is easy to notice that the fundamental element of the above theoretical construction is the concept of abstraction. However, in this regard, there was no change between the psychologistic and anti-psychologistic stages, because already in (Twardowski, 1898/1965, p. 156), he had a developed theory of abstraction, and nothing in his writings suggests that anything changed significantly in this respect. Furthermore, a key element of the mentioned theory of abstraction is the concept of represented judgment, which can replace judgments in certain cases, for example, when we understand what someone says, although we do not want to say that it is so (Twardowski, 1898/1965, p. 149-150). Therefore, it can be said that in terms of describing cognitive mechanisms, nothing changes significantly.

In this regard, Twardowski's text that happens to be extremely interesting is "On so-called Relative Truths" (1900/1999; 1900/1965), in which he presents an argumentation showing that the theory positing the existence of relative truths is false because all examples of alleged relative truths are not such. Although at first glance one might suppose that the very term "judgment" used in this text indicates that there is no mention of mental actions here, it would be rather a mistaken assumption, considering that Twardowski only later became aware of this difference. At most, one could argue that Twardowski uses the word "judgment" in both of these senses because he is not yet clearly aware of the difference between them. However, it is not this term that is interesting, but the argumentation itself, or rather the assumptions underlying it. Twardowski argues that truth is simply a true judgment. Relative truth, on the other hand, is truth that is true only under certain circumstances, i.e., a judgment that is true only under certain circumstances. The greater part of Twardowski's argumentation relies on showing that relative truths would have to meet two criteria. Firstly, they must be judgments that become false with a change of circumstances, but remain unchanged in every other aspect. Secondly, they must be judgments that only become or have become false with a change of circumstances. Furthermore, "one may only speak of one and the same judgment if [...] the same subject of the judgment is given, the same predicate, the same quality, number, etc." (Twardowski, 1900/1999, p. 149; Twardowski, 1900/1965, p. 317).

Thus, in light of the above characterization, we are dealing with an object that has the following properties:

1. It can be true or false.
2. It can be entertained by different individuals in different circumstances.
3. Its criteria of identity depend on its subject, predicate, quality, quantity, etc.

Regarding point 2 of this characterization, regardless of whether we adopt the interpretation directly suggested, meaning we are dealing with the same judgments held by two individuals, or we adopt the interpretation presented in "Actions and Products" (Twardowski, 1911/1999; Twardowski, 1911/1965) according to which common features of two numerically different acts account for our ability to speak of the same judgments, from the perspective of the reconstructed theory of logic, this does not change anything. As for point 3, practically the entire argumentation revolves around demonstrating that in many cases of alleged relative truths, we are dealing with a change in the meaning of the expressions used. However, according to the later theory proposed in "Actions and Products" (Twardowski, 1911/1999; Twardowski, 1911/1965), the meaning of an expression is nothing other than the product of the act of judging, i.e., a judgment.

Therefore, it seems that on the side of the object, everything is exactly the same as in the case of the later anti-psychologistic theory. In both cases, we have a certain action, in both cases, a certain meaning is distinguished, which we can abstract, and ultimately, in both theories, we can in a sense talk about different people having the same judgment. It is also impossible to assume that something has changed regarding what would distinguish judgments from each other, as already in (Twardowski, 1894/1977; Twardowski, 1894/1965), he acknowledges the idiogenic theory of judgments. If so, what is the difference? At first glance, one might assume that the difference lies in

the fact that in the later period, Twardowski recognized the apriority of logic. However, this is not true, as evidenced by the following text from the University Logic Course of 1898-1899:

“Laws” in the logical sense we call judgments, whose subject concerns relations of necessary connection. These relations pertain either to the necessary coexistence of certain attributes, properties, etc. or to the necessary succession of certain phenomena. The necessity, which can be affirmed simply by considering the concept of objects, hence the necessity derived from the contemplation of the concepts of objects between which it holds, is termed ‘logical necessity,’ or ‘a priori.’ (Twardowski 1898-1899/2023, p. 77)

Therefore, it seems that Twardowski’s theory did not change significantly in its essential aspects. However, this would contradict how he described his philosophical development. In light of this, should we conclude that Twardowski was mistaken in this matter, or perhaps consider that the above reconstructions are incorrect in some aspect? I believe we should reject both options and once again refer to the previously cited passage from the biography, where the last two sentences play a crucial role in our problem:

But Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, which appeared some years later (1900/1), convinced me that it is impossible to treat psychological, that is, empirically acquired, knowledge as the basis of logical, thus a priori, propositions. My book on the basic concepts of didactics and logic [*Zasadnicze pojęcia dydaktyki i logiki do użytku w seminariach nauczycielskich i w nauce prywatnej*(1901)] was written prior to my study of Husserl’s work, so that in it I still came forth as an “exponent of psychologism” [Psychologist]. **But my psychologism of that period manifests itself more in the demarcation of the material to be dealt with than in the manner of its treatment. For I maintain in general that the opposition between psychologism and anti-psychologism in logic is ultimately an issue that pertains to the scope of its domain rather than to the theoretical grounding of its propositions.** (Twardowski, 1926/1999, p. 31)

I believe that in light of the above analysis, the last sentence becomes more meaningful than upon initial reading and is the key to solving the mentioned puzzle. And my proposed answer to it is that the difference between the psychologistic and anti-psychologistic stages does not involve a significant change in the system of ontology, but rather a shift in emphasis. Through reading Husserl’s text, Twardowski assures himself that logical investigations do not concern the acts of thinking themselves, leading him to the conviction that it is the general forms of content (meanings) of those acts of thinking understood as their dependent (metaphysical) parts that are the subject of logic. In this spirit, he seeks a way to better express this intuition and place it in a broader theoretical context. In the course of these investigations, he finds a series of linguistic differences that align with this distinction, and also provide hope for the theoretical unification of the field of psychology. In this way, Twardowski develops the theory of products. However, non-enduring products, which are the only products of mental acts, are not something he adds to his ontology as an additional theoretical postulate, but rather something that was already part of his system. In this work, he only finds linguistic anchoring that allows him to isolate them as a particular kind of objects of detached concepts, which are important from a theoretical point of view. Thus, the change in Twardowski’s thinking can be likened to the situation of a person who, for a while, believed that rhythmic is a science that describes a musical composition, until at some point, they realized that it is a science that describes not the entire composition, but only a certain dependent element of that musical composition, namely rhythm. Such a change, however, is not a change in ontology – it is not that a new entity is postulated that was overlooked by the earlier theory. Rather, from the beginning, it is a certain layer of the already recognized object that is accepted but not paid attention to because it is believed to have nothing special about it.

According to Twardowski, the issue of psychologism does not concern the theoretical justification of judgments because it is still rooted in a particular kind of internal experience, namely (multiple) abstraction performed on acts of judgment – without such abstraction, we would know nothing about logic.

The proposed hypothesis, however, is inconsistent with the previously mentioned opinion of experts on Twardowski's work, who argue that in the later phase of his career, Twardowski moved away from ontological psychologism. According to my hypothesis, there is no change in the ontology system at all, only a reidentification of the object of logic, thus merely delimiting the scope of logic differently. It seems to me that the above reconstruction is correct, so I have nothing else to do but to invoke the ancient adage: "Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas."

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## Notes

1. Specific methods of a given science can be preliminarily defined as those methods that are used in that science and are not used in any other science. This definition assumes, of course, that we are somehow able to distinguish between individual sciences.
2. Betti (2006) argues even for the thesis that it was Łukasiewicz, not Husserl, who played the most important role in changing Twardowski's views, contrary to the declarations of the latter.
3. I believe that the assumption that a given author fully understands the work they are reading should be the starting point for interpreting any author and should only be challenged when we have compelling reasons against such an approach.
4. Such an opinion can be found, for example, in the following works: (Ingarden, 1938), (Fisette, 2021), (Cavallin, 2001).
5. The concept of internal complement should not be confused with the concept of direct object. In the sentence "James plays football." the word "football" is a direct object, but it is not an internal complement (object), because it does not meet the criteria for internal complements.
6. In Polish an example of such a doubtful noun could be the word "pojęcie" (concept), which Twardowski pairs with the verb "pojmować" (to conceive). Although we can say in Polish "mam pojęcie x" (I have a concept of x) or "posiadam pojęcie x" (I possess a concept of x), it will not be synonymous with the expression "pojmuję x" (I conceive x). Expressions "pojmuję konia" and "mam pojęcie konia" are certainly not synonymous in Polish and the first one is arguably not even allowed by the system of meaning of the Polish language. This, however, need not be taken as a problem for Twardowski's theory, because the expression "Pojmuję x" functions as a technical term which could be rendered roughly as follows: "I think about x as something that is P.", where P is a shorthand for a conjunction of all the

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features I associate in this moment with the object I'm thinking about. The entire phrase "as something that is P" is meant to convey that what I think about a given object is merely represented judgment. (More on represented judgment below.) If so, then in this case, it is clear how this expression meets Twardowski's criterion, as it falls under the schema "I think a thought." As far as I understand the meaning of the word "conceive" in English, it can be applied to all objects, and one can say "I conceive a horse," although it is a rather rare expression and its immediate meaning associations are quite different. However, it is not excluded that other expressions used by Twardowski may imply incorrect usage in English. In such a case, it should be noted, as in this case, that a given expression may be a technical term in Twardowski's philosophy.

7. The division between what is mental and what is physical is of course present from the outset in Twardowski's thought, see for example (Twardowski, 1894/1977, p. 1; Twardowski, 1894/1965, p. 3).

8. It should be noted at this point that the formulated criterion of being a psychophysical action leads to the conclusion that the class of psychophysical actions will include actions that we would not initially classify as psychophysical. This will be the case, for example, with the activity of sweating. If I sweat in a certain situation, it may be because I am nervous, so there is a certain mental activity that influences the physical activity, so sweating should be classified in this case as a psychophysical activity.

9. It may be worth noting that in this text Twardowski suggests that a mental action and a mental product constitute a certain whole, which is a fact, whereas reading the quoted fragment from the treatise "Actions and Products" (1911/1999; 1911/1965) might lead to the conclusion that the action itself is that whole. It is impossible to fully consider this problem here, so in the further part of the text, I will treat the action itself as the overarching whole in relation to the product, as it seems more natural from a linguistic point of view – we would call the "passing a judgment" an action rather than just "passing." I believe that adopting the second option does not affect the reconstruction presented by me in any way.

10. "Metaphysical parts (also called logical by some) [...] [are] parts which can only exist within the whole they belong to but cannot exist without the whole. We do not speak of metaphysical parts that a whole can be divided into them, but rather, that they can be discerned within the whole." (Twardowski, 1902-1903/2014, p. 162; Twardowski, 1902-1903/2012, p. 157)

11. "Analytic concepts are the representations of such objects as need to be set apart from a larger whole by means of analysis, objects of which it is possible to have an intuitive representation only in conjunction with that whole." (Twardowski, 1924/1999, p. 84; Twardowski, 1924/1965, p. 301)

12. Such an interpretation is suggested, for example, by the remarks of Maciej Witek in the book *Spór o podstawy teorii czynności mowy* [The Dispute Over the Foundations of Speech Act Theory] (2011), where he argues that "in the case of speech, the difference between the act of uttering (utteratio) and the utterance, which is the product of this act (utteratum), is not real but conceptual. Kazimierz Twardowski draws attention to this fact in the work 'Actions and Products.'" (p. 44; translation mine). A similar interpretation is also proposed in: (Brandl, 1998). In the case of this article, however, it should be emphasized that Brandl proposes this interpretation not only based on the interpretation of what Twardowski wrote, as he considers it insufficient to decide between the conceptual and ontological interpretations but also because the conceptual interpretation better deals with the issue of psychologism. I think Brandl is mistaken in both respects, but in this article, I only demonstrate that the available writings of Twardowski rather point to the ontological interpretation.

13. The editor of this volume of *Inedita*, Jacek Jadacki, suggests that these texts were written before World War I, with the second text in this part being dated after 1910. However, assuming that they were indeed written before World War I, we can more accurately determine the date of these texts, namely the year 1914. My proposed dating stems from the fact that in both of these texts, Twardowski refers in footnotes to the work of Daniela Tennerówna [Gromska] (1914), in which she demonstrated that the terminology used by Twardowski is misleading, and this text was published precisely in 1914. However, I do not have access to all the information that served as the basis for such dating, and the fact that Gromska's text was listed in the bibliography with the correct date leads me to suspect that the editor had other reasons not to date the text to 1914. Perhaps these texts were created over a longer period, and only the mentioned fragments were introduced in 1914.

14. In the original Polish text, Twardowski uses the word "tkwić," which could also be translated as "to inhere."

15. The terminology on this subject is heterogeneous. Some would call such anti-realist positions nominalism, but others would classify trope theories as nominalism, which, however, recognize the existence of individual qualities but deny the existence of universals, which hardly can be called anti-realism regarding properties. As an example of a paradigmatic anti-realist theory regarding properties, one can mention Kotarbiński's reism, see e.g., (Kotarbiński, 1949/1966; Kotarbiński, 1949/1986).

16. Another argument in favour of Twardowski conceiving attributes realistically may be that when discussing divisions of objects among real beings, he distinguishes attributes, among which he includes, for example, the decisiveness of belief. See: (Twardowski, 1926-1927/2023, p. 43).

17. In this regard, I differ from Szylewicz's English translation, as he translates Twardowski's term 'powiedzenie' as a 'sentence,' which can be misleading. This is because 'powiedzenie' has a narrower meaning than the word 'sentence' [zdanie]; not all types of sentences (e.g. imperative) are statements (in the proposed sense), but even not all indicative sentences are statements (in the proposed sense), but only those whose cause is a judgment. My proposed translation

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diverges from the typical meaning of the term ‘powiedzenie’ in Polish, which could be roughly translated as ‘utterance.’ However, this deviation is due to Twardowski’s proposed definition of the term, which deviates from the normal meaning, at least from the perspective of the contemporary Polish language.

18. Therefore, I believe that Twardowski’s position on properties should probably be characterized as some type of theory of individual properties (“abstract particulars,” to evoke associations with the class of theories associated with this unfortunate term), whereby the objects we perceive possess these properties in some way, rather than them being mere reflections of our cognition or language, and at the same time, no two objects share the same properties. However, this issue would require a more in-depth analysis than what I have presented above.

19. Another candidate to linguistically convey the concept of a represented judgment could be “I think of x, which is P.” I believe that the phrase proposed in the main text is better because if we substitute “this object” for x, then in the case where one of the attributes from P is not actually possessed by the object, we would obtain a false sentence. With the proposed phrase, there is no such problem. It should also be noted that the expression “I think of x, that it is P” would also be unacceptable because it informs the recipient that the speaker believes that x exists. For example, if I say, “I think of Tralalinka, that she is very wise,” then in normal circumstances the recipient will conclude that I believe Tralalinka exists. However, if I say, “I think of Tralalinka as someone who is very wise,” the recipient will understand that I am thinking of someone, but will not be inclined to attribute to me the belief that Tralalinka exists. Even if it’s not the case, it will at least refrain from attributing to me the belief that Tralalinka is very wise. Of course, in normal circumstances, I can say, “I think of Holmes, that he is a worse detective than Poirot,” because most interlocutors living in the same culture will know that both Holmes and Poirot are fictional characters, which results in a kind of contextual “tuning.” Yet another potential candidate for this linguistic equivalent could be “I think of the existence of x being P,” which would be a literal rendering of the concept of a represented judgment. However, I’m not sure if Twardowski meant that, for example, in every act of imagination we think of the existence of the given object, and not just of the object itself regardless of its existence. Due to this uncertainty, I will use the previously proposed phrase. However, I do not exclude the possibility that ultimately the latter phrase would be the most appropriate interpretation of Twardowski.

20. At this point, I must emphasize that this is a component of my reconstruction of what Twardowski means by represented judgments. Twardowski does not explicitly clarify this matter in this way anywhere.

21. The English translation uses the phrase “non-intuitively” to render the Polish word “nienaocznie.” However, it must be borne in mind that this does not imply that what is discovered in concepts is non-intuitive (because, as we will see, some of what we discover in concepts is obvious), but rather that during such presentation, no perception related to what is presented is formed. The literal translation of this Polish term into English would be something like: “non-with-one’s-own-eyes-ness.” The word “naocznie” is also used in the expression “naoczny świadek” which means “eyewitness,” in which “świadek” means “witness.”

22. I also suppose that the very act of thinking should be perceived as abstracted from actual mental life, but this is a marginal issue in this context.

23. The reference of a given product to time is not a clear matter. On the one hand, products can be temporally determined, as we can successfully speak of “yesterday’s thought” or “an obligation that arose at a certain moment.” On the other hand, the reference to time is somehow modified through abstraction in some cases, as it is strange to speak of a “thought (about a cat) lasting for some time,” although one can say that “an obligation lasts from a specified date.” It is like that at least in the Polish language. Similar thoughts regarding English words “thought” and “judgments” are expressed in (Geach, 1960, p. 106). Perhaps in the case of products of different actions, different attributes are abstracted. It is also possible to hypothesize that the same words denote concrete products in one case and common components of these products in another (that is, in the case of judgments – abstract judgments). I leave this issue open because it does not have a direct bearing on the problem under consideration.